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“If one takes a look at today’s situation, one must acknowledge that the 
breakdown of expenses not only in the Armed Forces, but also in all 
power structures is hardly optimum.  We cannot describe it as optimum 
today when despite considerable resources being committed by the state 
to the country’s armed and power-related component, many of our units 
conduct no drills, no combat training.  If pilots do not fly, if sailors 
almost never put to sea, is everything all right in terms of the structure of 
the Armed Forces?” 
 
(Opening remarks by President Vladimir Putin at a Security Council 
meeting on 11 August 2000 to discuss a new Russian strategy for 
military planning until 2015.1) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, the Russian armed forces have experienced a continual 
financial crisis and a steep decline - as Russia’s defeat in Chechnya in 1996 and 
the renewed and ongoing war there since 1999 have brutally revealed.  The sinking 
of the Kursk submarine in the Barents Sea in August 2001, and the navy’s clumsy 
and futile rescue effort as well as its Soviet-style disinformation of its own public 
illustrated for many Russians and outside observers the crisis in Russia’s armed 
forces.  Indeed, it was a catastrophe waiting to happen.  The once mighty Soviet war 
machine had been brought to its knees by a lack of analytical strategic foresight 
and the economic realities.  In this light, the sinking of the Kursk was a tragic 
metaphor for the decline of the Russian armed forces in general and the Russian 
Navy in particular.2  
 
Since 1989, Russian experts have discussed genuine military reform.  So far, 
however, only modest steps have been taken.3  Mostly, the Defence Ministry, and in 
particular the Russian General Staff, has downgraded real “military reform” to a 
“reform of the armed forces” throughout the 1990s - and both “reforms” are not the 
same thing.4  Neither new strategic concepts nor modernisation plans during the 
1990s had been able to keep the military healthy because of deeper socio-cultural 
and intellectual reasons which are often overlooked.5  As a consequence, Russia 
was forced to rely on its nuclear posture more than ever.  Until the summer of 
2000, a further “nuclearisation” of Russia’s future defence policies, particularly in 
regard to lowering the nuclear threshold of its substrategic nuclear weapons, could 
no longer be excluded.  Against this background, considerable disagreement existed 
not only between the political and military elite, but also between Defence Minister 
Igor Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, over the future 
direction of military reform at the end of the Yeltsin era.6  The conflict and 
discussions highlighted the fact that Russia was standing at the crossroads and 
forced to choose between being a future global or a regional power - with the need 
for a decision by the political leadership that could no longer be ignored. 
 
Since the beginning of 2000, President Vladimir Putin has made valiant attempts to 
maintain Russia’s superpower military status under straitened circumstances.  In 
January 2000 he approved a new National Security Concept (NSC),7 in April a new 
Military Doctrine,8 in June a new Foreign Policy Concept,9 and in August 2001 a 
new Naval Doctrine.10  While all four of these key documents were shaped by a 
perceived need to preserve Russia’s superpower status, strong forces, and nuclear 
parity with the United States, there were also distinct differences between them.  
However, simultaneously, there was an unmistakable increase in concern about 
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military and foreign policy threats, by contrast to earlier documents such as “NSC 
1997”,11 in which the main security dangers were seen primarily as domestic.  The 
documents in the years 2000/2001 reflected a much more sceptical view of the 
world and a more confrontational attitude toward the US and the NATO.  NATO’s 
military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 certainly played an important role in 
influencing these official documents, but is insufficient to explain those underlying 
traditional threat perceptions. 
 
Proposals for military reform both predated and accompanied the new strategic 
concepts.  But a major barrier to any sensible reform has also been the lack of 
money.  Putin has compelled the armed forces to adopt more radical reforms, but 
since these reforms have tried to reconcile the very different interests of the various 
services, the armaments industry, and the foreign and security policy elite, they 
have not been coherent and have left many questions open.  Domestic debate still 
swirls around specific threat scenarios and the future of conventional as distinct 
from nuclear weapons.  Only against the background of an analysis of the 
important and in the West mostly overlooked internal and controversial debate 
between Sergeyev and Kvashnin of Russia’s different threat perceptions, including 
those after 11 September 2001, and their wide-ranging implications for 
restructuring Russia’s nuclear and conventional forces does Moscow’s changing 
policy toward American missile defence (NMD/TMD) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty since the autumn of 2001 become clearer - albeit the most important 
changes in Russia’s foreign security and defence policies took place before 
September 2001.  Thus the pace and amount of a START-III treaty and the 
reduction of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces were and are dependent on the 
official threat perception and nuclear deterrent strategy. 
 
In the following analysis, I will start by describing the internal crisis of the Russian 
armed forces and its implications, on the dangers of mounting integration, the 
impacts of the demographic and health crisis upon the conscription system, on 
crime, corruption and other socio-economic trends affecting the armed forces, on 
the problems of Russia as insufficiently presented defence budgets and the need for 
further downsizing of the regular armed forces.  On this basis, I will analyse the 
Kvashnin-Sergeyev conflict for re-directing funds to the conventional forces, and 
discuss Putin’s military reform agenda and the nuclear ambiguities of Russia’s 
defence posture as well as the implications for the future of Russia’s Strategic 
Nuclear Forces (SNF).  Thereupon, I will give an overview of Russia’s present 
military reform concept.  In this light, finally, I will conclude by giving a perspective 
of the still much needed “Revolution in Military Reforms” in Russia.   
 
 
The Deepening Crisis in the Russian Armed Forces During the 
1990s 
 
The irreversible disintegration of the Soviet Union following the attempted coup 
d’etat in August 1991 caught the Russian military politically, institutionally and 
psychologically largely unprepared.  Since that time, like large sections of the 
political elite, the military too found it extremely difficult to comprehend the new 
realities and to come to terms with the new role that accrued to them from the re-
orientation of state policy, as evidenced by constant grappling with the problematic 
military-policy burdens of the past on the one hand and the frequently inadequately 
defined and often diversely interpreted demands of the future on the other hand.  
During the 1990s, Russia’s armed forces were both the victim and the configurator 
of domestic and foreign policy developments.  The military establishment evidently 
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saw its duty of loyalty not so much as demanding voluntary and unconditional 
allegiance to the political authorities of the day as rather being dependent upon the 
extent to which the political leadership’s formulation of Russia’s institutional-
military and supposedly “objective” or “state-policy” interests matched its own 
definitions - which are mostly based on geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations 
of the Cold War period.   
 
Since 1991 a large number of concrete proposals for military reform drawn up by 
the Defence Ministry as well as by civilian and military experts have been under 
discussion.  In the 1990s, the Russian forces dropped from 2.8 million to 1.2 
million, with actual numbers well below official figures.  Mostly, however, the 
Defence Ministry, and in particular the Russian General Staff, has downgraded real 
“military reform” to a “reform of the armed forces” - and both reforms are not the 
same thing.12  While the latter envisions primarily just cutting troop numbers and 
some structural-organisational reforms of the armed forces themselves, a real 
military reform envisions fundamental changes in all spheres related to the armed 
forces, including reforming the civil-military control system, the defence industry 
and initiating deeper reform of the entire military organisation.  Characteristic of 
almost all official military reform conceptions of the Defence Ministry was the gap 
between military pretensions and economic reality - a gap which widened until the 
mid-1990s and which could be closed only from the pretensions side.13  In this 
light, numerous problems complicated even a very narrow understanding of military 
reform or reform of the armed forces such as: the rise of so-called other forces, the 
increasing disintegration accompanied with a decline in morale, mounting crime, 
the unsolved dedovshchina problem (the systematic oppression of young recruits by 
their older comrades), the crisis in the Russian conscription system, lowering of 
operational readiness, etc. 
 
Other Armed Forces 
In the aftermath of the parliamentary shootout of October 1993, President Boris 
Yeltsin increased in quantity and quality the so called “other forces” (such as border 
troops and those belonging to the Interior Ministry or other agencies) as part of a 
divide-and-rule tactic to maintain a political balance between the power ministries.  
He hoped to ensure that no single military formation would become the dominant 
force and therewith a threat to his power.  As a result, Russia had not only still 
more than 2,136,000 men under arms (as well as 960,000 civilian employees in the 
twelve power ministries and security organisations) in the year 2000;14 the regular 
forces also had to compete with at least eleven other ministries for financial 
resources, recruitment of conscripts, and real command authority.  Moreover, these 
“other forces” created their own separate district organisational structure without 
adopting regulations for inter-force co-ordination.15 Thus joint military action 
between the regular armed forces of Russia and the “other troops” had to be 
negotiated on an ad hoc basis by unit commanders of the various forces, as in the 
Chechen wars.  Against this background, it becomes understandable that the 
General Staff of Russia’s regular armed forces demanded command of all military 
forces for joint military action like in Soviet times.  But the military establishment 
simultaneously also tried to erode the newly established civilian control on the 
basis of presidential oversight (instead of the parliamentary mechanisms for 
oversight in Western democracies).  The Yeltsin administration, however, feared that 
the General Staff could use its commanding power to become the kingmaker in any 
internal crisis, as in October 1993 when the General Staff hesitated to support the 
beleaguered Kremlin after finding the military itself on both sides of the 
barricades.16 
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Table 1: Regular & Other Forces in 199517 
 
 
Category 
 
Number 
Agency Budget 
(Roubles trn) 
Ministry of Interior (MVD)  
 Army Gen Anatoliy S Kulikov 
300,000 
 
10,408,730 
Federal Border Service (FPS)  
 Army Gen Andrey I Nikolayev 
250,000 
 
2,331,073 
Federal Security Service (FSB)   
 Army Gen Mikhail V Barsukov 
130,000 1,470,001 
Military Space Forces (VKS)   
 Col-Gen Vladimir L Ivanov 
16,000 1,027,733 
Civil Defence & Disaster Relief (MChS)  
 Lt-Gen Sergey K Shoygu 
40,000 869,873 
Communication & Information Agency (FAPSI) 
 Col-Gen  Aleksandr V Starovoytov 
50,000 722,447 
Special Military Construction Directorate (SSMO)  
 Col-Gen Aleksandr V Tumanov 
97,000 663,000 
Main Protection Directorate for Individuals & Installations (GUO)   
 Lt-Gen Yuriy V Krapivin 
40,000 479,094 
Defence Highway Construction (FDSU) 
 Maj-Gen Ivan D Marchuk 
170,000 397,526 
Railroad Troops Agency (AzhV) 
 Col-Gen Grigoriy I Kogat’ko 
100,000 328,323 
Foreign intelligence Service (SVR) 
 Yevgeniy M Primakov 
15,000 208,921 
Presidential Security Service (SBPR)  
 Lt-Gen Aleksandr V Korzhakov 
4,000 33,710 
 
TOTAL 
 
1,212,000 
 
18,940,391 
Ministry of Defence 
 Army Gen Pavel S Grachev 
 
1,900,000 
 
65,855,130 
 
GRAND TOTAL 
 
3,112,000 
 
84,795.521 
 
 
Altogether, the armed forces had absorbed more than an estimated third of the 
national budget.  If these “other armed forces” had been included in Russia’s official 
defence budget (according to UN or NATO criteria), Russia would have had more 
than 3 million people under arms.18  According to the well-known military reformer 
Aleksei Arbatov, these often heavily armed paramilitary forces had a combined 
strength in 1997 of 1.2 million men and total funding of some $8 billion.19  All these 
military and militarised departments and their force structures have reportedly 
consumed almost 50 percent of all state budget expenditures.20  The regular armed 
forces receive less than two-thirds of all defence spending according to independent 
UN and NATO criteria, whilst the remainder is split between various paramilitary 
organisations.  In 2001, Russia’s total military expenditure was not less than 26.7 
percent of the total budget.21  Russian military reformers have criticised this 
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“overly-militarised state” for hindering political and economic development.22 
Furthermore, under Yeltsin the forces were mostly left to their own devices; the job 
of military reform was thus handed over to the institutions that needed reforming. 
 
Table 2: 12 Regular & Other Forces in December 200123 
 
 
Category 
Numbers of Troops/ 
Servicemen 
Internal Troops < 200,000 
Special Assigment Units of the Interior Ministry (Vityaz, 
Rus, Rosich, Skif, OMON, SOBR) 
3-4,000 
Troops of the Federal Border Guards Service 200,000 
(planned cut to 183,000 
in 2003) 
Civilian Defence Troops (of the Emergencies Ministry) 30,000 
Railroad Troops 50,000 
Federal Service of Special Construction (established in 
1997; comprises the Main Directorate of Exploitation  
and Restoration of the Ministry of Communications,  
Central Directorate of Military Construction Units of the  
Nuclear Energy Ministry, Federal Road-Building Service) 
< 14,000 
Main Directorate of Special Programmes of the President 20,000 
Federal Protection Service < 3,000 
Special Assignment Units (such as Alpha and Vympel of the 
Counter-Terrorist Department of the Federal Security 
Service) 
1,500-2000 
Zaslon (special unit of the Foreign Intelligence Service;  
formed in 1998) 
300-500 
Main Penitentiary Directorate (of the Justice Ministry;  
special forces to suppress prison riots, but used in  
Chechnya as well) 
? 
Special Detachments of Physical Protection (within the  
Federal Tax Police Service and State Customs Committee) 
> 10,000 
TOTAL 531,800-533,500 
 
 
Regular Armed Forces of Russia 
1.2 million 
(to be reduced to 
800,000) 
 
 
Russia’s “Paper Force” - Dangers of Mounting Disintegration 
The policy guidelines of the 1997 National Security Concept stated that, even if all 
of Russia’s armed forces (including those not belonging to the Defence Ministry) are 
mobilised, Russia could cope with at best just one regional conflict.  But even that 
had become more and more doubtful during the second half of the 1990s.  
According to one military source in 1999, unless funding were increased, only 40-
50 percent of Russia’s air fleet would still be operational by 2001.24  In the same 
year, 50 percent of aircraft and 40 percent of anti-aircraft systems and helicopters 
needed repairs.25  Also largely due to a lack of fuel, flight training in Russia’s Air 
Force was conducted at only 35 percent of desired levels in 1999, a decrease from 
45 percent in 1998.26  As a result, the average number of flying hours a year was 
only 10-20 per pilot,27 compared to NATO figures of up to 180 hours.  That 
reduction resulted in a threefold increase in the number of accidents in the first 
half of 2000 compared with the same period a year previously.28 
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A US State Department report of 1999 about the “rapid decay” in Russia’s military 
readiness was even more alarming: in 1998, the Russian army had to cancel 65 
percent of its planned regimental exercises and 27 percent of battalion level 
training.29 Although the Russian navy officially still had 80 major warships 
(including one aircraft carrier), 160 minor combatants, 24 amphibious ships, and 
70 mine countermeasure vessels, its real operational readiness might have been as 
low as 10 percent - in contrast to more than 70 percent during the Cold War.30  Sea 
duty for the Russian submarine fleet, for instance, was reduced by 25 percent, 
while surface ships cancelled 33 percent of their planned exercises in 1998.   
 
In summer 1999, only three divisions and four brigades in the Leningrad, Moscow, 
North Caucasus and Siberian military districts maintained the status of 
“permanent readiness units”, which requires having at least 80 percent of full 
personnel strength and 100 percent of weapons and other equipment.  The major 
military exercise “ZAPAD-99”, conducted in June 1999, demonstrated a much 
better capability to deploy large combined-arms forces than many Western experts 
expected.31  However, the exercise used up the navy’s entire annual fuel reserve.32  
Moreover, as the renewed war in Chechnya started in September 1999, Russia’s 
conventional military capabilities became increasingly overtaxed. 
 
The system for calling up conscripts also became increasingly obscure because of 
exemptions, deserters and dedovshchina.  Citing reports that the military illegally 
used inexperienced conscripts to fight the Chechen rebels, Tatarstan declared that 
it would no longer send its conscripts to fight for Russia in the “hotspots” because 
they had not received training for those combat missions.33  According to Russian 
law until the end of 1998, conscripts could be used in armed conflicts only on a 
voluntary basis.34  The Defence Ministry felt compelled to compromise because it 
worried that other regions would follow Tatarstan’s example. As the second 
Chechen war indeed revealed once again, Russia’s conscripts were largely neither 
well-trained nor had the morale for fighting in the ethnic wars on Russia’s southern 
periphery - particularly protracted conflicts in which larger numbers of soldiers die. 
 
At the same time, Russia’s conscription system was at the brink of collapse.  Draft 
evasion has been rampant since the early 1990s, and the broad-based desire to 
avoid military service has been institutionalised in legislation that legally frees 
roughly 85 percent of all Russian draft-age men from service.  The reasons are 
manifold: brutality in the barracks, often abysmal living conditions, shortages of 
food and sometimes the basic necessities of life, and the conduct of two bloody wars 
in the North Caucasus.  The result is an army manned in large part by the most 
disenfranchised of Russia’s underclass and an available draft pool with inferior 
rates of education, but with higher-than-average rates of health problems and 
criminality.  According to the military prosecutor’s office, 700 to 1,000 young 
conscripts die every year in “non-combat situations”, albeit independent watchdog 
groups such as Mother’s Right believe the real numbers are up to four times 
higher.35 
 
Impact of the Demographic & Health Crisis 
The statistics in 1999 revealed that the health crisis and drug problems also 
increasingly affected the armed forces.36  Reportedly, the number of healthy 
conscripts dropped by 20 percent over the previous decade.  According to Defence 
Ministry data in spring 2000, 10 percent of conscripts in the ground forces and 
navy were drug addicts, and one in every nine crimes in the armed forces were 
drug-related.37  Nearly 33 percent of all conscripts were either exempted or 
“reprieved” for health reasons during the spring-summer call-up campaign.  Drug 
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addiction had soared by 100 percent since 1993.  In 1999 alone, the number of 
crimes connected with illegal drug trafficking committed by servicemen increased 
by 32 percent.  In the Chelyabinsk region alone, a rise of over 300 percent since the 
mid-1990s had been reported.38  In autumn 1999, 57 percent of those examined 
were regarded as unfit to serve, and 49,000 men, almost one fifth of the total 
conscripted, did not report for duty.  Despite the expected one million conscripts in 
spring 2000, the armed forces were only able to draft 13 percent, or 191,612.39 
 
Crime, Corruption & Other Socio-Economic Trends 
There are other problems, as well.  Incidents of bribery increased by almost 40 
percent in 1999, although overall crime rates had fallen by 12.4 percent compared 
with summer 1998.40  Housing is another challenge: by the end of 2001 140,000 
servicemen lacked apartments for their families.41  Furthermore, the widespread 
socio-economic crisis in the armed forces resulted in a growing de facto alliance 
between local military commanders and regional political bosses - a fact that has 
opened the door to patronage, widespread corruption, and weapons smuggling.  All 
these negative trends had been particularly prevalent in the military districts of 
Siberia and the Far East.42  Crime, accident rates, inadequate maintenance of 
weapons and infrastructure, failure to pay for energy and food all seemed to exceed 
the levels in European military districts.  In July 1998 Aleksandr Lebed, governor of 
Krasnoyarsk Kray, in an open letter to Moscow even threatened to assume control 
of the nuclear weapons based in his region in order to force the government to pay 
its soldiers.43  However, the threat of  “nuclear regionalism”, the possibility that 
regional leaders might acquire de facto control over various nuclear assets on their 
territories, including missile material, nuclear power stations, and ultimately 
nuclear weapons, was fortunately rather remote, but not entirely unrealistic for the 
near and mid-term future. 
 
At the same time, the future of the Russian armed forces is dependent upon a well 
trained and educated officer corps.  But by 2001, 47 out of 102 Russian military 
academies had been closed since 1998, with another 10 forthcoming.  In this 
regard, the lack of a professional NCO base is one of the biggest challenges to 
reform and to fight the still widespread dedovshchina.  Pavel Felgenhauer, for 
instance, lamented in February 2001: “Commanding generals are not ‘reforming’ 
anything within their domain for the simple reason that they genuinely believe the 
Soviet military machine was the best in the world and it doesn’t need reform, but 
restoration.”44 
 
However, the military is not alone to blame for the catastrophic situation in the 
armed forces.  The majority of Russia’s ruling political elite has largely maintained 
the former Soviet threat perception and the belief in Russia as a great power 
regardless of all qualitative and quantitative economic, social and demographic 
factors.  Even in Russia’s foreign policy concept of June 2000, it was stated 
explicitly that “Russia is a great power; one of the most influential centres of the 
modern world”.45 
 
Problems of the Defence Budgets 
From the very creation of new armed forces in 1992, Russia had inherited the 
majority of the huge Soviet war machine and too little financial resources to 
maintain and - to a certain degree - also reform it.  Although the armed forces were 
reduced under Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, the gap between Russia’s military 
ambitions to maintain at least a military great (if not super)power status and the 
economic-financial constraints had widened.  At the end of the 1990s, Russia and 
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its military had only maintained a “Virtual Great Power Status” that could hardly 
cover its declining influence on the global and regional levels.46 
 
The collapse of Russian state finances in summer 1998 made any effective military 
reform even more doubtful.  In the second quarter of 1999, the under-financing of 
the armed forces amounted to 200 million rubles; only 31 percent of the military 
budget had been confirmed.47  At the same time, total debts to the Army and Navy 
had reached 50 billion rubles, almost half of the entire defence budget.48   As a 
result of domestic uncertainties, details of the 1999 defence budget were classified 
again - for the first time since 1991.49 
   
In this context it is important to stress that Russia’s defence budgets have never 
been as transparent as the defence budgets of NATO states.  The 1998 defence 
budget, for instance, still excluded the amounts spent on “other forces,” or the 
expenses for the military reform programme itself.  Though Russia’s Defence 
Ministry lobbied for 310 billion rubles, the official defence budget in 1998 was just 
81.7 billion rubles.  Of that, the military had received only 30 billion rubles by the 
end of November 1998.  At that time, the defence ministry’s debts totalled 60 billion 
rubles, including 16 billion rubles in salaries and pensions.50  In April 1999, the 
federal government owed nearly 7.5 billion rubles just to armed forces personnel.51 
 
In the mid-1990s, the Ministry’s own most optimistic projections saw adequate 
funding beginning only in 2004, but the financial crisis of 1998 had made even 
those earlier calculations unrealistic.  Given this background, it was also not 
surprising that large portions of military expenditure remained hidden in other 
budgets, making it impossible for the Duma and its defence committee to exercise 
proper parliamentary oversight.  As the chairman of the Duma Defence Committee, 
Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev, confirmed in September 2000: 
 
“The detailed breakdown of the defence spending has been classified top 
secret, with no coherent explanations offered, for the fourth year in a 
row.  There are only six expenditure items in the open part of the budget.  
As a result, the Federal Assembly is deprived of the opportunity to openly 
discuss and solve financial problems related to defence spending that do 
not include any classified data.  Actually, Russia informs the world about 
its defence spending, via the UN, much more thoroughly than it informs 
its own citizens and legislators.”52 
 
Moreover, by the end of May 2000, the military had only received 6.5 percent of 
promised funds for 2000.53  Actual defence expenditure is not 2.64 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) as officially stated (below the 3.5% of GDP that President 
Boris Yeltsin ordered as the highest boundary for the defence budget), but more 
realistically 5 to 6 percent.  Throughout the 1990s, however, the armed forces 
actually received only a portion of the budget promised. 
 
The Need for Further Cuts 
While the official overall strength of the regular Armed Forces had been reduced to 
1.2 million by 1 January 1999 and is expected to fall further, only about one-third 
or even one-quarter of that number can be considered genuinely operational.  
Without the political will to make drastic cuts, Moscow instead maintains a largely 
non-operational military establishment that will exacerbate the severe structural 
weaknesses dating back to Soviet times.54  As Aleksey Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of 
the Duma Defence Committee, argued: 
 
D65 
 
Frank Umbach 
 
10 
 
“If Russia decided to bring the financing of its servicemen up to US 
standards, then it would have either to reduce its army from the current 
1.2 million servicemen to 100,000 people or increase the military budget 
up to 6 trillion rubles, or seven times greater a sum than the overall total 
of the 2000 federal budget.”55   
 
Under the present and projected budget levels, the principal priorities of Russia’s 
defence policies are unrealistic.  Arbatov offered the following options for setting 
priorities for Russia’s conventional and nuclear forces in the year 2000: 
 
Table 3: Future Russian Force Options56 
 
 + 
A* 
+ 
B* 
√ 
C* 
√ 
D* 
√ 
E* 
Strategic Nuclear Warheads 1,500 2,000-2,500 3,000 2,000 1,500 
Forces for Local Conflicts Larger Minimal Larger Moderate Larger 
Forces for “Balkan-Type” Contingency Minimal Almost none Minimal Moderate Larger 
 
Assumptions: 
 
*   Raise defence budget to 3.5% of GNP. 
+   Keep the armed forces at their current level of 1.2 million personnel. 
√   Reduce military personnel to 0.8 million and change ratio between maintenance and 
investment portions of defence budget to 55:45 or even 50:50.   
 
 
Given the scarce resources, a further reduction to some 600,000 seemed 
unavoidable within the next decade.57  However, Russia’s General Staff still saw 1.2 
to 1.3 million as the “minimum strength” and the “crucial barrier which the state 
cannot cross”.  This was because the military and political leadership might not 
resort to using even a limited number of nuclear weapons for solving defence tasks 
in a local war which can escalate to a full-fledged regional war (against NATO and 
the US), as the Chief of the Centre for Strategic Forecasts of the General Staff, 
Colonel Vyacheslav Zubarev, argued in June 2000.58 
 
In summer 1999 the defence ministry had great difficulty in mustering 60,000 
soldiers for the invasion of Chechnya, and more than 40,000 troops had to be 
mobilised from other forces in order to secure the operational minimum of 100,000.  
It was these problems that induced then Prime Minister Putin even before he 
became President in January 2000 to embark on a proper reform of the military.  
According to military journalist Alexander Golts, however, the generals had no real 
desire for reform, as was clearly shown in the June 1999 staff exercises with 
nuclear scenarios (“Zapad-99”) and in the spring manoeuvres and missile exercises 
of 2001.59  
 
Furthermore, Russia’s military hardware will become obsolete by 2005-2010.  In 
this light, Sergey Rogov has warned that Russia has no more than 10 years to 
strengthen the country’s economy.60  Indeed, most weapon systems Russia 
produced from 1992-1999 had been exported to foreign countries. 
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Table 4: Weapon Deliveries of Russia’s Military Industrial Complex, 1992-
199961 
 
 
 
Weaponry  
 
 
Exported Abroad 
Deliveries to 
Russia’s Armed 
Forces 
Ships 11 2 
Submarines 10 2 
Main Battle Tanks 435 31 
Armoured Personnel Carriers & Infantry 
 Fighting Vehicles 
 
217 
 
17 
Planes 278 7 
Helicopters 98 8 
Aircraft & Other Missile Defence Systems 22 1 
 
 
Overcoming Excessive Reliance on Nuclear Weapons - Putin’s 
Plans for Comprehensive Military Reform 
 
The Kvashnin-Sergeyev Conflict Over Redirecting Funds to the 
Conventional Forces 
 
“Our military faces a systemic crisis, which must be solved by radical 
measures.  … As the choice looks now, we will lose our parity with the 
US or we are going to lose the war in Chechnya.  More likely, we’ll lose 
both.” 
 
(Pavel Felgenhauer in summer 2000)62 
 
Following the promotion of Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces 
(SRF) Igor Sergeyev to the position of defence minister in May 1997, he succeeded 
in merging the Space Defence Troops, Missile Defence Troops and the Missile Early 
Warning Systems (MEWS) with the SRF.  He also sought to create a Joint High 
Command for the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) which, in contrast to other 
proposals, would not be part of the General Staff.63  It would also control the 12th 
Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defence,64 which maintains and stores all 
nuclear warheads in Russia - a task given traditionally also to the General Staff.  
Therewith, the SNF and its Joint High Command would have become a powerful 
competitor to the General Staff that would have broken with more than 70 years of 
Soviet tradition.  Reportedly, some 80-90 percent of total armament resources were 
channelled to Sergeyev’s former command of the SRF by the end of the 1990s.65  
Hardly surprisingly, that drastically worsened the state of the conventional forces 
and offered a striking contrast to the “Concept of Development of Nuclear Forces 
until 2010” and the “Foundations (Concept) of State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Area of Defence Development until 2005”, adopted in July-August 
1998.66  Sergeyev, the Foreign Ministry and many civilian foreign and security 
experts justified their favouritism for Russia’s SRF on the grounds that under all 
circumstances Russia must maintain nuclear parity with the US and NATO.67  In 
fact, Russia’s nuclear arsenal was the last attribute of a “virtual” superpower whose 
economic base was becoming ever more dubious.68  Therefore, they 
instrumentalised the official threat perception in which NATO and the US nuclear 
strategic forces were portrayed as the most dangerous threat to Russia’s national 
security.   
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Against this background Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin presented 
some radical proposals for changing Russia’s armed forces by 2016 at a Defence 
Ministry staff meeting on 12 July 2000.  These essentially favoured developing 
conventional weapons at the expense of the SRF.  He justified the 
“denuclearisation” by arguing that not NATO and the US Strategic Nuclear Forces, 
but rather the ethnic regional conflicts at the southern rim of Russia and Islamic 
fundamentalists and terrorists were the most dangerous threats to Russia’s 
security.69  Accordingly, he told senior officials and the business establishment that 
Russia could no longer sustain a posture like NATO’s, nor could it compete 
militarily with the Western alliance.  Therefore, he also favoured a new foreign 
policy that envisioned a closer relationship with the West and even the future 
possibility of NATO membership.70 
 
By 2003 Kvashnin foresaw a reduction in the status of SRF from an independent 
force to a weapons system that would be absorbed into the air force; thereafter, the 
Russian military would go over to the classic tripartite division of land, air and sea 
forces.  In addition, by 2003 there would be a unilateral reduction in the SRF from 
19 to 2 divisions and scrapping of 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
and 500 to 1,500 warheads.  In fact, this meant a unilateral disarmament of more 
than 400 of the total stock of 780 ICBMs, the majority of which needed to be taken 
out of service in any case, either because of age or treaty requirements under 
START II. By 2001 space weapons and missile-defence forces (which had been 
taken from the air force in 1997 by Sergeyev and folded into the SRF in what was 
called a “coup d’état within the military apparatus”) were to be put under the 
command of the General Staff.71 
 
These proposals immediately ran into massive resistance, not only from Sergeyev, 
but also from the Foreign Ministry and many other senior officers as well as from 
prominent civilian military experts like Aleksey Arbatov and Sergey Rogov.  The 
latter accused Kvashnin of a “strategic capitulation” towards Washington because 
“the US gets an overwhelming advantage in its nuclear capacity, and will be able to 
secretly deploy thousands of ordinary high-precision weapons to attack Russia’s 
sites,”72 and: “Abandoning the nuclear shield, Kvashnin will turn Russia into an 
Indonesia without missiles.  There will be no turning back then, because the 
Russian missile industry will be destroyed for good.”73  
 
This clash was to some extent the continuation of a row between two schools of 
thought and their different worldviews throughout the 1990s: a “traditionalist” 
school of thought who saw Russia’s military potential as the guarantor of its 
international great power status and directed its policies against any foreign policy 
losses or deterioration of Russian military power in general and of its Strategic 
Nuclear Forces in particular; and a more “realist” school of thought who favoured 
aligning Russia’s future with contemporary economic and political realities inside 
and outside Russia.74  Its continuation at the highest level inside the Russian high 
command led to a split of the military elite.  It signalled that at least the General 
Staff was overcoming the “Kosovo syndrome,” the expectation of NATO’s use of force 
against Russia over political disagreements.75  That led to a further increase in the 
reliance on tactical nuclear weapons as the only means to deter NATO.  Russia’s 
political elite had painfully to discover that Russia had no military instruments to 
influence a Yugoslav-type future conflict: their conventional forces were too weak as 
the second Chechen war demonstrated, whilst Russia’s strategic nuclear forces 
were not credible because Moscow was not willing to commit suicide over Serbia or 
other similar conflicts.  As a Russian commentator summarised the conflict inside 
the Russian high command in March 2002: 
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“... when Sergeyev was the minister, the Strategic Rocket Forces did what 
they wanted with the military budget, commandeering a lion’s share of 
the funds for themselves.  It was done to the detriment of other branches 
of the service, without so much as a thought spared to their needs.  It 
should be noted here that national interests of Russia were not 
jeopardised by a hypothetical nuclear exchange, and it does not take a 
genius to understand that the amount of delivery means for strategic 
nuclear arms Russia possesses is too much for it.  As for the Russian 
general application forces, they were left far behind world standards in 
virtually all parameters.  The situation being what it is, Kvashnin ...  
could not do other than to incite a mutiny against the missile tyranny.  
By the way, virtually all Russian generals supported him in this.  Had it 
not been for the rebellious chief of the General Staff, the pseudo-reforms 
initiated by Sergeyev might have utterly ruined the Army and Navy.  It 
was so apparent that even leaders of the state backed up Kvashnin.  All 
the same, the ‘battle’ is still presented to the general public as a public 
brawl inflamed by Kvashnin.”76 
 
The Ambiguities of Russia’s Defence Posture 
 
“The conflict in the top echelons of the military command makes it 
patently clear that the military should not be allowed to reform itself.  It 
is here that the conflict is essentially rooted.  This is why civilian control 
is needed and the military has to be split into political, administrative, 
and operational commands.  There can be no doubt that sooner or later 
‘Kvashnin’s plan’ will be implemented, with or without Kvashnin.  Such is 
the objective tendency of transformation of the Russian Armed Forces.” 77 
 
Because of this polarisation among the generals, Putin was forced to make a basic 
decision in order to avoid further erosion and disintegration in the armed forces.78  
But interestingly, he stopped any debate only after Sergeyev reacted to Kvashnin’s 
demands.  Despite their public infighting, the meeting of the Security Council on 11 
August 2000 did not result in the immediate sacking of either Sergeyev or 
Kvashnin.  But he dismissed six generals allied with Sergeyev who reportedly 
resisted plans to disband the SRF and subordinate them to the Air Forces in order 
to cut costs.  It indicated that Putin took sides with Kvashnin in the unusually 
public feud over how to divide Russia’s scarce resources between conventional and 
nuclear forces.79 
 
But it helped Putin considerably to redirect Russia’s foreign and security policies on 
the basis of a more realistic threat perception towards a rapprochement with the 
West, NATO and the US - long before the September 2001 events.  Thereby Putin 
also redefined Russia’s arms control and disarmament policies in regard to the ABM 
treaty and a START-III compromise.  In this respect, Putin followed the strategic 
agenda of Kvashnin and the General Staff. 
 
The proposal by the Chief of the General Staff to “denuclearise” Russia’s forces was 
particularly explosive because it was a clear departure from the “nuclear” defence 
policy set out in the 2000 Military Doctrine and NSC documents that gave special 
recognition to the enhanced value of substrategic nuclear weapons.  Russia had 
already dropped its 1982 pledge to a “no-first use” policy on nuclear weapons in the 
document “Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” 
in November 1993.80  It had since underlined the increasing role of Russia’s 
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in its defence policies.81  Many Russian 
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security and defence experts advocated placing a greater reliance on nuclear 
weapons to compensate for the deficiencies of the country’s conventional forces.  
Not only strategic, but also tactical nuclear weapons played a much more important 
role in Russia’s defence posture, and particularly in the Far East opposite China.82  
This new emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons had already been confirmed in 
Russia’s 1997 NSC83 and in doctrine and strategy proposals in the following years.  
It suggested an excessive reliance on nuclear forces for virtually any military-
political contingency, including the right to use them as first strike weapons and 
even pre-emptively in ethno-political conflicts that Russia’s conventional forces 
could not realistically and effectively deal with.84  
 
Reports about the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad 
Oblast in January 2001 - which Russia immediately officially denied - highlighted 
the sub-strategic nuclearisation tendencies in the European theatre as well.  It also 
demonstrated once again that a verifiable treaty for tactical nuclear weapons 
between NATO and Russia was urgently needed.85  Characteristically for the 
enhanced status of Russia’s nuclear weapons in its defence posture, Russian 
military experts produced and discussed a concept of “de-escalating” conventional 
conflicts through the use of nuclear weapons and described the evolving security 
posture as “extended nuclear deterrence” to demonstrate Russia’s resolve and 
readiness to use force, including nuclear weapons.86 
 
Moreover, there are at least 6,000 operational warheads and thousands more in 
storage, indicating that these weapons were not destroyed as pledged by former 
Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin in 1991 and 1992.  In 1997 the well-known 
Russian military expert and journalist Pavel Felgenhauer had already criticised the 
“nuclearisation” of Russia’s defence policies in 1997: 
 
“... money is being spent on superfluous nuclear missiles which, in 
accordance with agreements on non-targeting, are aimed ‘nowhere’.  The 
fairy tale of reform ‘under the nuclear umbrella’, the new missiles and 
discussions on parity will be paid for not only with money, but also with 
the blood of Russian soldiers in future local conflicts in this country’s 
southern regions.”87 
 
Table 5: Russian Nuclear Forces 2002: Non-Strategic Forces88 
 
 Launchers Warheads 
Air defence   
 SAMs (SA-5B Gammon, SA-10 Grumble) 1,200 1,200 
Bombers & fighters   
Tu-22M Backfire (105), Su-24 Fencer (280) 385 1,540 
Naval   
Aircraft   
Tu-22M Backfire (45), Su-24 Fencer (50) 95 190 
Cruise missiles   
SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-21, SS-N-22 n/a 240 
Anti-submarine   
SS-N-15, SS-N-16, torpedoes n/a 210 
TOTAL  3,380* 
 
* An additional 8,000-10,000 non-operational strategic and non-strategic warheads may be 
in reserve or awaiting dismantlement. 
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Indeed, Russia placed too much emphasis on nuclear scenarios that were largely 
unrealistic and did not address any of the most important security problems on its 
southern flank.  It tried to bolster its declining world power status but without 
having effective means of control,89 and instead of improving living conditions and 
raising the actual fighting capacity of conventional troops engaged in peacemaking 
missions and internal conflicts. 
 
The current Military Doctrine states that Russia must have a potential for nuclear 
deterrence ensuring “the infliction of required damage to any aggressor, either state 
or a coalition, under any circumstances.”90  Although the final version of the 
doctrine does not specifically mention Russia’s right to the first use of nuclear 
weapons, the document makes clear that “the Russian Federation keeps the right to 
use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear arms and other WMD 
[weapons of mass destruction] against it or its allies, and in response to a large-
scale aggression with the use of conventional arms in situations critical for the 
national security of the Russian Federation”.91  The vagueness of the phrase 
“situations critical for national security” enables Moscow to interpret it relatively 
freely, although the October 1999 draft version of the doctrine was even more 
ambiguous in this regard.92 
 
Moreover, Russian nuclear weapons designers are confronted with the fact that 
their country can no longer afford a vast nuclear weapon archipelago like that of the 
Soviet era.  As a result, they have lobbied together with General Staff to build a new 
generation of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons - weapons which could be 
Moscow’s answer to its lack of high-precision conventional weapon systems, and 
which have been defined as “strategic weapons”.93 
 
However, the use of Russia’s present tactical nuclear arsenal even in a major 
military conflict with China is very questionable because of the vicinity of almost all 
major Russian cities and military headquarters in the region to the common border 
with China.94  The use of non-strategic nuclear forces is only a deterrent when 
Moscow would use longer-range tactical nuclear weapons that threaten China’s 
hinterland and major cities beyond the common border.  Recognising these defence 
dilemmas on its potential eastern front, Russia may develop a new generation of 
tactical nuclear weapons and munitions with low-yield and super-low-yield, 
delivered to targets by both strategic and tactical delivery systems such as the 
newly developed Iskander 400 km short-range missile system.95  In 1999, Russia 
conducted seven sub-critical tests on Novaya Zemlya and more in 2000.96  However, 
START-I prohibits the deployment of new air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on 
medium bombers, reducing the options for a cheap expansion of a theatre-range 
nuclear force, whereas the 1991 decision by President Gorbachev (confirmed by 
President Yeltsin in 1992) to retain only air based tactical nuclear weapons prevents 
their deployment on ships, submarines or on the Iskander missile.  That explains 
why the Russian military favoured giving up these arms control agreements and 
their restrictions which prevented cost-effective military solutions to their perceived 
potential security threats.  As Nikolai Sokov rightly argued: 
 
“Paradoxically, the less threat Russia anticipates from NATO, the greater 
the propensity to withdraw from arms control treaties and the greater the 
emphasis placed on substrategic nuclear weapons (including the use of 
heavy bombers for theatre missions as well as ALCM deployment on 
medium bombers).  If the threat from NATO is low, then existing treaties 
lose their primary value: restrictions on US and NATO forces.  Instead, in 
the absence of threat from the West, Russia would be able to disregard a 
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possible buildup of US nuclear forces and perceive much greater value in 
increasing its own nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis other threats (from the south, 
for example).”97 
 
Furthermore, the serious internal debate over the use of nuclear and chemical 
weapons in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000 seemed to confirm that Moscow’s priorities 
still tended toward a further nuclearisation of Russia’s defence policy.98  But given 
Russia’s economic and financial constraints, further modernisation of its Strategic 
Nuclear Forces and tactical nuclear arsenal would only exacerbate underlying 
problems because it would come at the further expense of conventional forces.  It 
would result in a continued decline in morale and operational effectiveness at a 
time when Russia must cope with a lasting and extremely violent ethnic conflict in 
the Northern Caucasus - a conflict that Putin tries to end but has no solution in 
sight.  Hence, reliance on the nuclear factor does not necessarily guarantee Russia’s 
national security under all circumstances, including dealing with potential threats 
posed by China.   
 
Against this background of a dangerous excessive emphasis on nuclear weapons for 
all kind of contingencies with the prospect of conducting warfighting according to 
concepts of operational art that envision the pre-emptive or even the preventive use 
of tactical nuclear weapons in ethnic conflicts, Kvashnin’s key conclusion was 
based on a more realistic analysis in which it was not the US and NATO that were 
the main threats to Russia, but the conflicts in Chechnya and elsewhere, where 
nuclear weapons cannot guarantee Russia’s security and stability.   
 
Implications for the Future of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) 
In the 1990s, Russia’s nuclear forces had become a multiplier to compensate for the 
inferiority and the declining capabilities of its conventional forces.  But directing the 
constrained budget for Russia’s military to the SRF deepened the problem of an 
unbalanced force structure, incapable of coping with the most pressing military 
contingencies: limited wars and low-intensity conflicts.  Nonetheless, funding for 
the new Topol-M (SS-27) missile - in particular for its more survivable, but also 
more expensive road-mobile version - was still insufficient.   
 
But despite many persuasive arguments, Kvashnin’s expectation of large budget 
savings from the SRF cuts is exaggerated.  In 1999 the SRF was supposed to have 
consumed 18 percent and in 2000 10 percent of the total defence budget.  But 40 to 
60 percent of all research and development money and 80-93 percent of 
procurement funds went to the SRF.99  As it is less the missiles than the associated 
infrastructure (such as early warning systems and satellites, 80 percent of which 
need replacing) that is costly,100 Kvashnin’s reform proposals would save only some 
19 million rubles over 15 years (0.7 percent of the planned defence budget for the 
period).  Furthermore, nuclear disarmament requires substantial new investment 
for the storage and destruction of warheads and ballistic missiles.  By 2007, Russia 
will have built and deployed less than (the originally planned) 150-170 Topols, not 
to mention the 600-700 it requires for maintaining the START-II level of around 
3,000-3,500 warheads.101  As originally agreed on 3 July 1998 at a Security Council 
meeting, Russia wanted to produce 30-40 new SS-27s on average per year (also the 
most cost effective rate of production), and 350-400 until 2010.102  In the 1980s, 
the production rate of the SS-25 was, on average, 48 per year.  A lower figure of 20 
new SS-27 would not translate into any significant financial savings because of the 
research and development costs.  Russia would just obtain fewer missiles for the 
same money.  An even lower production, down to 12-15 ICBMs per year, would 
threaten the survival of the network of about 200 suppliers.103  
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But even the goal of 150-170 with a present production rate of just six new Topol-M 
per year seems rather unrealistic.  It is more likely that Russia will not have more 
than 100-120 new Topol-M ICBMs, whilst the life-spans of nearly all older Soviet-
made SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs will be exhausted.104 
 
Even if part of this counter-argument is exaggerated, Russia still faces the dilemma 
of having to make a strategic choice between substantial new investment in a new 
strategic nuclear weapons system or cuts in its nuclear arsenal.  In the next few 
years, the Russian Defence Ministry plans to invest less than 28 percent of all 
financial resources appropriated for the acquisition of new strategic nuclear 
weapons and infrastructure into the radical modernisation and restructuring of its 
Strategic Nuclear Forces.105  High-yield liquid-fuel MIRVed ballistic missiles are 
being replaced with single warhead Topol-M missiles of which Russia has 30 at 
present.  The construction of the new Yury Dolgorukiy-class nuclear powered 
submarine armed with 20 new solid-fuel SLBM (each Bulava-30 missile - a solid-
fuel SLBM based on the design of the Topol-M ICBM - has ten warheads) has 
started, albeit the development of this new missile has been extended and that 
makes its production before 2010 highly uncertain.  In the coming 10-15 years, 
only two to three new nuclear powered strategic submarines will be produced for 
the Russian Navy, with a maximum of 200-300 strategic nuclear warheads.106 
 
Furthermore, a new generation of ALCMs with a range up to 5,500 km has been 
developed for heavy bombers.  However, the Air Force can count on keeping not 
more than 100-200 ALCMs on its TU-160 strategic bombers.  At present, Russia 
has 20 of those bombers which can each carry 12 ALCMs.107  While these 
programmes will ensure an effective nuclear deterrence and maintain Russia’s 
security, the production rate of these new missiles and submarines will also be 
rather limited as the result of the new defence priorities, the numerous constraints 
of Russia’s defence budget and the need to invest heavily in modernising the C4I 
infrastructure.  Up to 80 percent of Russia’s ballistic nuclear missiles are to be 
withdrawn from active service in light of START-II and because of their age before 
2005-2007.  The service life of some older missiles can maybe be extended for some 
few years.  But this will not solve the SNF’s structural problems because their 
service life is much shorter than Western missiles’ due to poor quality and 
maintenance difficulties.  Even the service life of the newish Topol-M can currently 
only be extended by one or two years.108  Hence it seems that Russia will enter the 
second decade of the 21st century with a nuclear arsenal of probably less than 
1,000 strategic nuclear warheads that equals those of France, Britain and China 
rather than that of the United States.109  That also explains why some Russian 
military experts have called for an official START-III ceiling not of 1,500 but of just 
1,000 warheads.110 
 
In this light, the SRF Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev, 
defended Russia’s ratification of START-II in April 2000 against the criticism in the 
Russian Duma, the public and the armed forces themselves by pointing out: 
 
“START-II allows Russia and the US to have 3-3,500 warheads each.  I 
think this is more than enough.  I also think START-II is good for Russia 
from the economic point of view, since 70% of missiles, 60-70% of 
combat control equipment, and about 70% of satellites now in operation 
have already become obsolete.  Besides, 60% of information systems in 
the missile-space defence forces are out-of date.  … Over the past ten 
years, expenditures on the Russian Armed Forces have been reduced 
approximately ten-fold.  Research and development has suffered the 
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most, as well as weapons and military hardware procurement.  This has 
impacted greatly on the Strategic Missile Forces.  Last year we received 
only 45-50% of the minimum needs of our forces.  … The number of 
satellites is decreasing faster than new ones are being launched.”111 
 
Furthermore, in any variants of the future structure of Russia’s SNF, the role of the 
naval strategic nuclear forces will increase to 35-55 percent of nuclear delivery 
systems.112  However, this restructuring will involve a more costly investment in 
Russia’s future nuclear arsenal. 
 
One possibility is, however, to reach a compromise with the US for a START-III 
agreement that gives up the provision of START-II to equip an ICBM just with one 
warhead.  As of mid-2002, Russia has an arsenal of approximately 8,400 
operational nuclear warheads, with almost 5,000 deployed on strategic nuclear 
weapons systems (see Table 6), and nearly 3,400 sub-strategic and air defence 
warheads (see Table 5).  Furthermore, Russia has around 10,000 more nuclear 
warheads kept in storage.  Some are destined for dismantlement, others may 
function as a strategic reserve for a possible re-deployment.113  
 
Table 6: Russian Nuclear Strategic Forces, 2002114 
 
 
Type 
 
Name 
 
Launchers 
Year 
Deployed 
Warheads x yield 
(kiloton) 
Total 
Warheads 
ICBMs      
SS-18 Satan 144 1979 10 x 550/750 (MIRV) 1,400 
SS-19 Stiletto 137 1980 6 x 550/750 (MIRV) 822 
SS-24 M1 Scalpel 36 1987 10 x 550 (MIRV) 360 
SS-25 Sickle 360 1985 1 x 550 360 
SS-27 n/a 29 1997 1 x 550 29 
TOTAL  706   3,011 
SLBMs      
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray 96 1978 3 x 200 (MIRV) 288 
SS-N-20 Sturgeon 40 1983 10 x 100 (MIRV) 400 
SS-N-23 Skiff 96 1986 4 x 100 (MIRV) 384 
TOTAL  232   1,072 
Bomber/Weapons      
Tu-95 MS6 Bear H6 32 1984 6 AS-15A ALCMs or 
bombs 
192 
Tu-95 MS16 Bear H16 31 1984 16 AS-15A ALCMs or 
bombs 
496 
Tu-160 Blackjack 15 1987 12 AS-15B ALCMs, AS- 
16 SRAMs or bombs 
180 
TOTAL  78   868 
GRAND TOTAL     4,951 
 
ALCM - air launched cruise missile; AS - air-to-surface missile; ICBM - intercontinental 
ballistic missile, range greater than 5,500 km; MIRV - multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles; SAM - surface-to-air missile; SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile; 
SRAM - short-range attack missile. 
 
 
In this light, Russian experts would like to counteract the cuts of numbers of 
nuclear missiles by equipping them with multiple, independently targetable, re-
entry vehicles (MIRVs).  While a single-warhead Topol-M ICBM costs around 100 
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million rubles, a missile equipped with three warheads costs 150 million and a 
mobile Topol-M missile with three warheads 200 million.  This would offer a cost-
effective way to modernise and maintain a strategic arsenal of 1,000 to 1,500 
warheads as Russian experts have analysed it.115  A MIRVed arsenal has also been 
seen as a countermeasure and “asymmetrical response” against too ambitious and 
threatening US missile defence plans.  In this regard, Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov went further in May 2000 by remarking: “If the US withdraws from the ABM 
treaty, Russia would consider itself free from any regulations of the treaty. Then we 
will have to consider the agreement on liquidation of medium- and short-range 
systems”.116  However, other military sources have pointed out that the 
transformation of the Topol-M into missiles with MIRVs will be expensive and cost 
over $1billion, and the programme will take 5-7 years.117 In this regard, Russia’s re-
MIRVing programme becomes questionable. 
 
The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty of May 2002 
The new Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), signed on 24 May 2002118 
between the US and Russian presidents at their Moscow summit meeting, will not 
change very much on Russia’s side in regard to its SNF.  Both sides agreed to cut 
their “operationally deployed strategic warheads” to 1,700-2,200 each - 
approximately two-thirds from their present strategic nuclear arsenals over a 10-
year period.  The treaty, composed of just 485 words in five articles, however does 
not define which strategic warheads it covers (or what “operationally deployed 
strategic warheads” really mean - Russia has a different interpretation) nor how 
those are to be counted.  The US side was primarily interested in as much flexibility 
as possible, including having the possibility to quickly re-deploy warheads which 
have been removed from delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles and bombers.  
By 2012, it is expected that the US will have deployed 2,200 strategic weapons and 
retain an additional 2,400 in an operationally maintained status of “responsive 
capability”.   
 
The final negotiations revealed on one hand the new strategic quality of the US-
Russian relations after 11 September 2001, and on the other hand the following 
three facts which are often still overlooked by Western critics of the SORT: 
 
1. The more Russia’s strategic nuclear forces have declined over the last 
decade, the more it is Russia (and not the US) that is primarily interested 
in an agreed treaty on the strategic nuclear forces of both sides as well as 
an inspection regime similar to the existing one for START-I.   
2. But simultaneously, the better the bilateral relationship develops 
between Washington and Moscow, the less important becomes the treaty 
for both sides.  The strategic relationship between the US and Russia is 
already moving from one of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) of the 
Cold War period into one of Mutual Assured Security (MAS).119  
Negotiated arms control then will have only residual importance.  The 
Bush administration has already declared that it seeks a nuclear 
relationship with Russia similar to those between the US and its nuclear 
allies of Great Britain and France, where a strategic nuclear arms control 
or arms reduction treaty is no longer necessary.120  
3. Interestingly, the critics of the new treaty in Moscow as well as in 
Washington and Europe cling much more to the Cold War period and a 
mutual threat perception (or at least a lasting mutual mistrust) than 
those supporting the new treaty who are mostly concerned about very 
different threats in the world.   
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But critics, too, admit that lowering the number of deployed warheads decreases 
the number of warheads ready for quick use - therewith reducing risks of an 
unauthorized or accidental launch due to Russia’s deteriorating early-warning 
capability.  Nonetheless, it is understandable that Russia sought rules that would 
count warheads according to the maximum number any deployed delivery vehicle 
could carry similar to those of START-I.  While the new SORT offers each side a 
much greater flexibility, at the same time it offers little predictability in regard to 
future strategic nuclear force structure - a central purpose of all former nuclear 
arms control treaties,121 but also the consequence of their former and to some 
extent still existing mutual threat perceptions.  But as two US scholars have 
correctly pointed out: 
 
“Indeed, with Washington and Moscow working toward friendship 
relations, the warheads Russia keeps in storage - not the ones it deploys 
on its ICBMs, bombers, and submarines - may well be the greater 
nuclear threat to the United States.”122 
 
For Russia, the new treaty seems to offer a possibility it long has sought: to re-
MIRV its ICBMs.  In the Russian view, the combination of the end of the operational 
lifetimes of more than 60 percent of Russia’s ICBMs, very low procurement rates of 
just 6-10 new missiles during the last four years and the transition to light ballistic 
missiles with single or few warheads, is leading to a radical decline in Russia’s SNF 
around 2010.  Therewith, a nuclear balance with a rising nuclear power such as 
China that has its own modernisation programme for strategic nuclear forces, 
including an expensive programme to develop MIRV warheads for its new ICBMs 
and SLBMs after 2010 is only a question of time.123  Alexander A Pikayev, for 
instance, pointed out in 1999: “… maintaining this [nuclear] predominance 
[towards China] is vitally important for maintaining the fragile stability along the 
banks of the Amur River.  A Russo-Chinese arms race would not be possible for 
Moscow as long as Russia adhered to the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs.”124 
 
However, another Russian military expert pointed out in June 2002 that it might be 
unrealistic to re-MIRV ICBMs because of the reference to START-I in the new 
SORT.125  Further negotiations between Russia and the US about a limited Russian 
re-MIRVing with US consent may take place, if Washington has not already agreed 
to it. 
 
But given the operational lifetimes of its older SS-18, SS-19, SS-24 and SS-25 
ICBMs and the re-direction of financial resources away from strategic nuclear forces 
towards conventional forces, Russia might have only funds for re-MIRVing its new 
Topol-M ICBMs with three nuclear warheads in the future.  Given the present 
production rate of just six new ICBMs a year, Russia may only be able to increase 
its strategic nuclear arsenal of around 1,000 warheads by not more than 100-200 
warheads before 2010-2015.  Even the new SORT, that allows a re-MIRVing, thus 
will not solve the underlying structural problems of Russia’s future SNF but will 
just buy some limited time. 
 
In this light, Russia now seems to have opted to withdraw from the provisions of 
START-II and to keep its present arsenal of MIRVed ICBMs.  According to defence 
Minister Sergey Ivanov, Russia will retain some 154 SS-18 heavy ICBMs and 36 
combat rail-mobile SS-24 - all carrying 10 MIRV warheads.  Originally, those ICBMs 
were to be phased out before 2003 and eliminated before 2007 under START-II.  
Ivanov explained that this decision was not a response to the US withdrawal from 
the 1972 ABM treaty.  At the same time, he hoped that these MIRVed ICBMs will be 
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maintained operationally until 2016.  But such an extending of the missiles’ service 
lives seems highly uncertain and costly at the expense of the already extremely low 
number of newly procured SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs.126  Whether this decision makes 
sense in the mid- and long-term future for Russia’s SNF seems rather doubtful.  
Furthermore, it will be interesting to see whether the US will agree specifically to 
Russia’s decision to maintain the heavy MIRVed SS-18 ICBMs which were the main 
US target for reductions under the past SALT and START frameworks as being the 
most destablising weapons in the Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. 
 
Russia’s Present Military Reform Concept 
With President Putin’s approval on 15 January 2001 of the “Plan for the Buildup of 
Military Forces to 2005” it became clear that even if there had been a political 
compromise, it essentially followed Kvashnin’s proposals.  The restructuring 
programme concentrates on re-balancing the force structure in favour of the ground 
forces, and emphasising combat training.  It envisaged across-the-board cuts of 
personnel of 600,000, of which 365,000 would come from the regular services; this 
would reduce these forces from 1.2 million to 835,000.  Originally the “other troops” 
were to be reduced by 60,000, but following a meeting on 9 November 2000, this 
figure rose to 105,000, with an additional loss of 120,000 civilian posts.  In this way 
the proportion of the defence budget used for personnel will be reduced from 80 to 
50 percent.  Before the end of 2002, 270,000 of the 365,000 positions intended to 
be eliminated by 2005 should already have been cut.127  Therewith, a smaller and 
more efficient army would be able to spend more on sophisticated high-tech 
weaponry.  70 percent of the defence budget had been spent on the soldiers’ 
incomes, leaving just 30 percent for weapons.  In the future, the ratio should shift 
to 60/40 in 2006 and 50/50 in 2011.128 
 
Table 7: Planned Reductions in the Russian Armed Forces (’000s)129         
 
 Armed Forces in 2000 Armed Forces in 2005 
 Servicemen Civilians Total Servicemen Civilians Total 
All forces 2,360 966 3,326 1,890 836 2,726 
MOD 1,200   835   
Interior Ministry 200   167   
Other 960   888   
 
 
These reductions, however, will also lead to new defence problems.  This is 
especially true in the Far East, where in future only 80,000 ground troops130 will 
face more than 2 million Chinese soldiers along a border of more than 4,000 
kilometres - and where China’s strategic nuclear arsenal could grow from its 
current 300 to between 600 and 900 warheads by 2010-2015.  This would call into 
question the Russian nuclear deterrent.131  Plans to merge the Strategic Rocket 
Forces with the Air Force further weaken the status of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear 
Forces in the overall defence posture and reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal to 
less than 1,500 warheads.  In 1998-99, just ten new Topol-M ICBMs had been 
produced.132  Although the production rate was planned to double and triple in the 
following years, production went down in 2001 and 2002 to not more than six each 
year - less than one-third of what had been planned.  The rate of destruction of the 
SS-18 Satan MIRVed ICBMs is therefore ten times faster than the rate of 
purchasing single-warhead Topol-Ms.  In the space sector, the production of 
intelligence, communication, warning, and navigation satellites was by 2000 
already dead.133  The orbiting group which supplied the Defence Ministry with 
intelligence reports and early-warning information was not modernised until 2001 
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despite the fact that the normal lifetime of 80 percent of Russia’s military satellites 
was already over.134  In 2001, Russia had 43 military satellites and about 20 dual 
application satellites in contrast to almost 200 it had had at the beginning of the 
1990s.  As a result, Russia is no longer capable of 24-hour reconnaissance from 
space.  Russia’s Global Navigational Satellite System (GLONASS), too, has only 9 
satellites instead of 24 and thus cannot operate properly.135 
 
On 28 March 2001 Sergeyev was relieved of his post and became Putin’s advisor for 
“problems of strategic stability”.  It was, however, not Kvashnin who became the 
new defence minister, but rather Sergey Ivanov, a trusted Putin advisor and 
secretary of the powerful Security Council.  He nudged the reform process in a 
direction that favoured conventional forces; he reinstated the Supreme Command of 
Ground Forces that had been disbanded by Yeltsin and Sergeyev in 1997.  But at 
the same time, he curbed Kvashnin’s ambitions and manipulation of the General 
Staff to report directly to the President, circumventing the newly appointed civilian 
defence minister.136 
 
In April 2001 Sergei Ivanov outlined the most comprehensive concept in the new 
Putin era for reforming Russia’s sprawling, ill-trained and under-funded and 
increasingly non-operational military.  It confirmed that the cuts in troop numbers, 
rationalised weaponry, and outlined tighter budget controls.  At the same time, he 
promised higher incomes of 60-100 percent for Russia’s professional soldiers over 
the next ten years.  He also confirmed previous plans to restructure Russia’s SNF 
and to take out the Space Forces and Space Defence Force (responsible for satellites 
and missile defence),137 which “produced an impressive economic effect” according 
to the Commander-in-Chief of the SRF, General Vladimir Yakovlev.138  They will 
constitute a separate unit, as was the case before President Yeltsin ordered a 
controversial merger of these forces in 1997.  In June 2001, Ivanov also dismissed 
Yakovlev, an ally of Igor Sergeyev, and appointed him the Chief of the Staff for co-
ordinating co-operation within the CIS. 
 
The shifting of funds away from the SNF to conventional forces was accompanied by 
a restructuring of the top military command.  The newly appointed Commander-in-
Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Nikolay Kormiltsev, was also named 
deputy defence minister, in contrast to the Commanders-in-Chief of the air and 
naval forces.  The airborne forces retained their status as an independent service, 
but their strength was to be reduced to 30,000 men. 
   
At the beginning of 2002, President Putin approved an armaments programme until 
2010 that places much more emphasis on research, development and engineering 
work, in which the project to develop and produce a fifth-generation multi-role 
fighter plays a very prominent role.139  However, some Russian experts believe that 
financing this new armament programme is also still unrealistic in the next 
decade.140 
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Better Times?  Russia’s Armed Forces in Summer 2002 
 
“Military Chiefs have been deliberately sabotaging all attempts at serious 
reform of the armed forces since 1992.  They still think they are 
preparing to fight a major war in which the West is the main potential 
enemy.  And given that this is the case, they will never cut back the size 
of their forces.” 
 
(Pavel Felgenhauer in March 2002)141 
 
Russia’s official defence budget rose from 141 billion rubles in 2000 to 219 billion 
rubles in 2001, with additional funds to cover the costs of the war in Chechnya and 
military reform.  Although the social situation in the military improved somewhat 
after Russia increased its military budget by another 25 percent in 2002 due to 
robust economic growth, and despite the shifting of funds to conventional forces the 
ground forces will not receive up-to-date military hardware by 2010.  Although they 
have benefited from the reordering of financial resources, the ground forces claim to 
have just 28 percent of the defence budget - 40-50 percent below what they say 
they need.142  Indeed, the focus of new procurement spending is directed towards 
the modernisation and upgrading of air and naval weaponry and in particular 
satellites, high-precision weapon systems and reconnaissance-strike complexes.  
But their production will begin only after 2006 or even later.143  
 
Instead, approximately 50 percent of the 2002 defence budget for modernisation 
and new procurement will be spent on upgrading obsolete military hardware.144  
Personnel costs still represent more than 70 percent of Russia’s defence 
expenditure.145  Furthermore, due to widespread misappropriation and 
embezzlement of military funds, even according to modest Russian calculations, 
over $1 billion may have been stolen from the Armed Forces in 2001.146  Moreover, 
Russia’s 2002 budget was based on unrealistic or at least risky economic 
assumptions.147  Funding revisions, as often happened during the 1990s, 
undermine predictability and responsibility inside as well as outside Russia. 
 
Putin’s force reductions and the modernisation of conventional forces signal, 
however, that the political leadership and part of the military establishment are 
slowly moving away from the old threat scenarios of the cold war.  But these 
reductions on their own do not automatically improve the force’s fitness for action.  
Nor is it clear that these reductions will suffice to overcome internal and operational 
problems.  The military has not received a real 50 percent increase.  Funding that 
was previously hidden in other budgets (though still not all of it) has now been 
included in official defence expenditure figures.148 
 
In the meantime, discussion about introducing a professional army seems to have 
been shelved albeit Putin promised a “compact, modern, well-paid professional 
army” by 2010 in November 2001.149  President Yeltsin had already signed a decree 
in 1996 whereby the draft was to have been abolished from spring 2000.  In 1998 
the edict was amended and the phrase “from spring 2000” was replaced with 
“gradually, as the necessary conditions are created”. In the following years, nothing 
was implemented; meanwhile the low pay has been the main reason why over 
15,000 young officers under 30 resigned between 1999-2001.  Every third position 
in the junior officer corps is now vacant.  At the same time, Russia in 2000 had four 
times more generals and admirals than it could afford.150  Indeed, the transition is 
financially expensive and politically risky given decades of Soviet tradition.  It is 
dependent on sufficient funds for demobilisation (neither the Khrushchev, the 
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Gorbachev nor the Yeltsin era can be seen as a positive model for new bigger cuts in 
the Armed Forces) and the willingness of the officer corps to support Putin’s long-
term vision of professional armed forces.  The Defence Ministry, including Defence 
Minister Sergey Ivanov and Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, however, 
has strengthened its resistance against the planned transition to a professional 
army151 albeit the demographic trends152 after 2005 will complicate any future 
conscription system.  The demographic crisis will reduce the number of available 
conscripts by 30-40% in 2005-6, leaving virtually no-one to be drafted given the 
present rate of less than 12 percent of all available153 who can be drafted into 
military service.154  It still reflects the former Soviet ambitions for large armed 
forces.  In the view of the Defence Ministry, the experiment to transfer the 76th 
airborne division in Pskov into a professional, all-volunteer force has failed and 
proven to be too expensive.  But Pavel Felgenhauer pointed out the core of the 
problem: 
 
“Of course, the result of the Pskov experiment has been all too 
predictable.  The military is actively sabotaging any attempts at reform.  
However, without reform, with millions of servicemen and some 100,000 
colonels in active service all told, there will be neither decent pay and 
service conditions nor a disciplined, modern force.”155 
 
Commentators were already speculating that the draft might last 15-20 years 
longer.156  In this context, the General Staff demanded a more stringent version of 
the draft law on “alternative service”.  The law adopted in April 2002 obliged  
Russia’s young men who opt for alternative service to serve four years after they 
have finished secondary schools, instead of two years in uniform.157  Another 
Russian military expert attacked the Defence Ministry with the words: 
 
“The military themselves know it too well.  They are absolutely 
unprepared to oppose these public moods.  They are in no hurry to 
abolish the draft.  They are unable to improve the real state of things in 
the armed forces.  They have no idea how to make military service 
attractive for most young men.  In consequence, the military plays the 
same mutual deception game, walks the same vicious circle (the 
conscript runs, the draft officer is hot on his heels) that compulsory 
military service has generated.”158 
 
Unfortunately for military reform, Putin’s long-term ally Defence Minister Sergey 
Ivanov seems also increasingly to disagree on almost every major security issue 
with the President.  He appears to have become a representative of the military 
interests in the Kremlin, and that has fuelled speculation that Ivanov would be 
replaced. 
   
Not only the mostly unchanged situation inside Russia’s armed forces and the 
perceived insufficient funds to solve their problems, but also the geopolitical 
alignment between Moscow and Washington in Central Asia and the Middle East 
and the compromises in regard to START-III and the ABM treaty have provoked 
rising opposition among Russia’s military at a time when Ivanov seems to be losing 
control of the armed forces. 159  President Putin, who met the high command of the 
Defence Ministry in October 2001 for a heated discussion, criticised the defence 
minister over the slow progress on military reforms.160 
 
Meanwhile, Kvashnin has bolstered his position as the leader of the “Chechen 
party” with his own men promoted to key posts in the Defence Ministry and the 
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armed forces.161  The government has counterbalanced his moves by strengthening 
the power of the FSB inside the military as a watchdog and by its own cadre 
policies.  None of the eight deputy defence ministers has participated in the war in 
Chechnya.  Those with Chechen experience are kept in the provinces.  Nonetheless, 
an alarming growth of war-fighting culture in the military has been identified.  Their 
rise could not only increase their influence inside their own organisation but in the 
political arena as well.162 
 
 
Conclusions & Prospects: A “Revolution in Military Reforms” 
is Still Waiting 
 
“Russia can take part in a nuclear apocalypse on equal terms, but the 
Russian Army is not prepared for a modern war with the use of 
conventional weapons.” 
 
(Mikhail Khodarenok in March 2002)163 
 
During the 1990s, Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons constituted in reality a 
declining instrument of war rather than a symbol of Russia’s self-image for its place 
in the world.  Recent changes imply “denuclearisation” of defence policy in general 
and of Russia’s strategic nuclear posture in particular, and contrast with a growing 
“nuclearisation” since 1992, especially in the enhanced status accorded to 
substrategic nuclear weapons.  The lowering of the nuclear threshold to the regional 
or even local level, as outlined in Russia’s Strategic Concept of January 2000 and in 
its Military Doctrine of April 2000, will remain for the most part unanswered in the 
next decade and in fact depend more on the actual efficiency of conventional forces 
in low-intensity conflicts than on the formal compromises laid down in these 
documents.  However, the re-prioritising of funds to conventional forces suggests 
that the nuclear threshold may rise again if the situation in the armed forces in 
general, combat readiness and efficiency significantly improve.  For the time being, 
in its own best interest, the West needs to follow closely those Russian military 
policy discussions, that until recently have been less concerned with nuclear 
deterrents than with the actual tactical nuclear weapons to be used at different 
levels.  The West needs to ensure that these policy discussions - including Russian 
readiness to resort to pre-emptive and preventive nuclear attacks in loosely defined 
“crisis situations” - are aired in the newly established NATO-Russia Council and 
other fora. 
 
Given the different threat perceptions, it is hard to understand why distinguished 
civilian experts like Aleksei Arbatov or Sergey Rogov cling to a “virtual superpower 
status” and the priority of modernising the strategic nuclear force when they 
themselves do not seriously believe in an American first-strike nuclear attack on 
their country.  By contrast, the dangers of a nuclear escalation of local and regional 
conflicts because of the poor state of conventional forces have constantly increased.  
The long-term reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenal is a precondition for 
solving the military’s internal problems and improving the quality of technical 
servicing of Russia’s strategic nuclear hardware to increase its safety. 
 
Whether the lifetime of Russia’s older ICBMs can be extended further seems highly 
uncertain.  More than 60 percent of Russia’s ICBMs are beyond their warranty life.  
The life-span of the SS-18s had already been extended from 15 to 22 years, whereas 
the lifetime of the SS-24 was extended only by one year.  Even the 360 newer SS-25 
(almost half of Russia’s ICBM force, produced between 1985-1994) will reach their 
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end of their lifetimes between 2008 and 2010.164  Moreover, to extend the 
operational life of its older missiles, Russia needs spare parts which are produced 
only in Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine.  In the 1990s, Russia had great difficulties in 
maintaining its older missiles properly.  Any extension programme would also be 
expensive and not cost-effective (given the operational lifetime of its ballistic 
missiles with the exception of the new Topol-M), leaving even fewer funds for the 
modernisation of the SNF and would not solve the structural problems, just 
postpone them for few years. 
 
Despite the fact that even the official Russian defence budget has tripled during the 
last three years, the military is still criticising substantial shortfalls.165  According to 
Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Igor Puzanov, lack of funding for training 
was not only undermining the armed forces, but also ruled out the planned 
replacement of conscription-based forces with a professional army in the immediate 
future.166  At the same time, the command of the SRF still insists on uniting 
Russia’s nuclear triad - land, navy and air forces - under one central strategic 
command.  While this would certainly raise the status of Russia’s SNF, it remains 
questionable whether nuclear modernisation will be hastened at the cost of 
conventional forces in the foreseeable future.167  
 
Any re-shifting of funds again to the SNF has become even more unrealistic given 
that the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have highlighted new urgent 
priorities in international security and for Russia too.  Its air defence, for instance, 
is in a critical condition and cannot effectively safeguard strategic sites against 
suicide hijacker attacks.  Even the then Chief of Russia’s Air Force, Anatoly 
Kornukov, admitted in an interview that a plane taking off somewhere in the 
Moscow region could hit the Kremlin before it could be intercepted by air defence 
systems because the level of combat readiness requires 10-12 minutes to bring it 
up.168  From 1994-98, the Russian air defence force dramatically declined: the 
number of fighter aviation units was reduced by 2.8 times, that of air defence 
missile units by 2.1 times; in 2000, the air defence troops received only 65 percent 
of required funding; purchases of new weaponry have stopped; obsolete weaponry 
systems account for 65-80 percent of the air defence troops’ armoury, and only 80 
percent of the armament is combat ready, while Air Force units have received only 
between 6-8 percent of the needed fuel.  Hence, in 1999 and 2000 an average 
fighter pilot spent just 11-12 hours annually in the air.  Meanwhile, nearly half of 
the most important state objects have been deprived of direct air defence missile 
protection.  A few days after the terrorist attack on the US, a Russian analysis 
warned:  
 
“... even if unprecedented measures are taken to restore the resources of 
air defence, these efforts will not result in effective protection against air 
terrorism.  Russia is too vast a country, and the number of strategically 
important or hazardous facilities on its territory runs to many hundreds.  
It is impossible to supply each such site with an air defence missile 
brigade or a fighter regiment equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry 
and placed on high alert status.”169 
 
Moreover, the increase in the defence budgets since 2000 was to a certain extent 
the result of rising global oil, gas and metal prices which allowed higher revenues 
for Russia’s state budget.  But becoming the hostage of world prices for energy and 
metal is not a sound financial basis for military reform in the forthcoming decade.  
Furthermore, although Russia has become the largest arms exporter (according to 
SIPRI) by accounting for 12 percent of the world trade in weapons and US4.97$ 
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billion of arms (compared with $4.56 billion worth of weapons sold by the US) in 
2001,170 which is the most important source of financing research and developing 
programmes for the military as well as the basis for survival of its largely 
unreformed military-industrial complex, it is similarly questionable whether Russia 
will be able to maintain its arms exports on this high level in the next few years.   
 
Even more important is the fact that the internal conditions such as dedovshchina, 
corruption and the collapse of the conscription system have hardly improved.171  
Alexander Golts, for instance, pointed out in July 2002:  
 
“Corruption in the officer corps is at such unprecedented levels that even 
the statement of the Prosecutor General’s Office - to the effect that the 
mine that killed dozens in Kapiysk on 9 May had been obtained by 
terrorists from officers of the Russian army - failed to shock anyone.  
Despite all promises of doubled pay, officers are doing all they can to quit 
the Armed Forces, the sooner the better.  There are 50 military 
educational establishments in Russia, but a quarter of lieutenant 
positions remain vacant.  As for senior officers, Ivanov himself doesn’t 
think much of their professional skills.  In short, solders view the Armed 
Forces as a prison, while officers lack initiative and are corrupt and 
incompetent.  The military is in the process of becoming a threat to its 
own people.”172 
 
Anatoly Kvashnin himself confirmed the condition of Russia’s armed forces on 30 
May 2002 at a conference on crime in the Armed Forces.  He described the present 
situation in the military as “beyond critical” with a decline in combat readiness 
which “could become irreversible”.173  Another official report stated recently that 46 
percent of servicemen live below the poverty line, whereas in the Interior Ministry 
53 percent and in the Federal Border Service 57 percent of families are officially 
impoverished.174  Although those figures are of course alarming and should attract 
the necessary attention of the Russian public and government, the Defence Ministry 
seems to use the depressing situation in the armed forces “to side-step the issue of 
military reform and substitute it with the problem of defence financing”.175  
Although Kvashnin bolstered his position inside the military after the conflict with 
Sergeyev, he is accused mostly outside the armed forces of plots and intrigues, 
undermining Defence Minister Ivanov’s position and not implementing military 
reforms.176 
 
Above all, the Defence Ministry needs to fight corruption itself instead of 
deliberately humiliating subordinates who are forced to break many laws on a daily 
basis in order to function at all and to survive with their families.  As Alexander 
Golts rightly described the situation in June 2002: 
 
“… the Defence Ministry has been creating almost perfect conditions for 
ubiquitous embezzlement.  Even though a fifth of state spending goes to 
the military, the public has no opportunity to monitor defence spending.  
Even Duma deputies, apart from Defence Committee members, do not 
know the purposes for which the Defence Ministry appropriates money.  
Meanwhile, the Defence Minister and Chief of the General Staff continue 
making great efforts to classify all information related to the Armed 
Forces as a secrets.”177 
 
In this light, the debates on future military reform are continuing as a 15-year long 
reform concept, comprising four phases, as Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev 
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(Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Duma) underscored in February 
2002.178  Although Putin’s and Ivanov’s concept is moving in the right direction, 
decisive measures may no longer be sufficient.  What Russia needs is a “revolution 
in military reforms” that goes much deeper and wider than the agreed cuts in the 
regular armed forces and other troops.179  It becomes even more important as the 
rest of the world - including NATO countries and China - undertake very ambitious 
military reforms. 
 
Thus far, Putin’s stated policy of increasing the official defence budget has not had 
a real impact on the Russian armed forces and its operational readiness.  The 
Defence Ministry continues to submit extremely unrealistic financial planning: for 
instance, it submitted to the government in 2000 another proposal to replace 50 
percent of military equipment over the period 2001-2010 with new or modernised 
weapon systems, for which the defence budget must increase to between 6.0 and 
6.6 percent of GDP - double present official defence expenditures, over the next five 
years.180  
 
But the core of financial problems for Russia’s military is not rooted in insufficient 
funds, but rather its clinging to traditional Soviet threat perceptions vis-à-vis the 
US and NATO as well as unwillingness to face the real problems and challenges of 
Russia’s security policies.  Furthermore, the military’s lack of transparency in 
defence spending and civilian accountability at nearly all levels allows massive 
corruption and bureaucratic game-playing.  Only on the foundation of a real, 
democratic, civilian, parliamentary control over the defence sector will it be possible 
to initiate a wide-ranging and deepening military reform that will last for at least a 
decade instead of proposing and initiating unrealistic reform concepts which can 
never be implemented due to the constraints of the overall economic foundation.  
The political and the military elite need to understand that the unstable internal 
conditions of Russia’s military forces pose a threat to the democratisation process 
in Russia and to its socio-economic stabilisation - a fact that is not fully understood 
in the West either.  Demands for higher increases in Russia’s defence budget will 
not resolve the core of its problems.  It speaks for itself that Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov published in July 2002 an unusual article in one of the most important 
newspapers in order to justify Putin’s pro-Western foreign policy against rising 
resistance in the political and military elite and accusations of pursuing a policy of 
“unilateral concessions vis-à-vis the USA”181 - ahead of a convocation of 
ambassadors which had not taken place for 20 years.182  
 
As it looks now, in the coming decade the significance of at least the strategic 
nuclear weapons in Russian defence policy will continue to decline.  The dreadful 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 too may have important consequences for 
Russian defence policy in focusing attention on strengthening conventional forces, 
while further weakening the arguments of the “atom lobby” and the “rocket mafia”.  
However, a successful military reform will be feasible only after the Chechen war 
ends.  That, unfortunately, still seems unrealistic given the vested interests of those 
officers and soldiers involved in widespread weapon sales and smuggling in the 
Chechen region and the lack of will to seek such a peaceful solution on both sides.  
But a  “revolution in military reforms” cannot wait forever in Russia. 
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